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Abstract: 
The purpose of our paper is to analyze corporate governance codes, currently in force in 
the European Union member states, in terms of disclosure and transparency compliance with 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development requirements and 
recommendations by reference to various features related to codes’ issuers and other particular 
characteristics. The research methodology used for achieving our goal is based on econometric 
analysis using various statistical tools (descriptive statistic, correlations and regressions).The 
results of the performed analysis are consistent with prior research findings, revealing that the 
level of provisions related to disclosure and transparency stipulated in corporate governance 
codes are influenced by their issuer’ s type and diversity. Moreover, we identified other features 
of a code such as their length, a separate chapter dealing with disclosure and transparency and 
its length, or the frequency of using these words and their definition, whose influence proved to 
be the same. 
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  1. Introduction 
 
The variety of definitions and models of corporate governance developed along 
time often gave rise to researchers’ concern over the convergence of corporate 
governance systems across countries, thus becoming a subject of interest and 
controversy in a variety of disciplines. Accordingly, there have been conducted various 
studies focusing on this aspect or at least aiming to compare regulations enforced by 
different jurisdictions.  
Theoretical studies published along time reviewing prior literature focused on 
codes of corporate governance succeeded  to highlight how fasten these spread 
around the world, thus transforming them in a highly debated topic of interest for 
academic research.  
Therefore, many questions have been addressed along time, some of them 
receiving a more or less comprehensive answer, while others are still unsolved. They 
started from finding out what exactly constitutes convergence, trying to establish the    
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major impediments that are standing in its way. Finally, they are looking for empirical 
evidence to prove that codes are moving towards or away from convergence. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section II we review the 
most relevant contributions of various researchers on this topic. Section III starts by 
presenting the research design used to undertake our empirical study, thus describing 
the sample selection and defining the variables used for testing the hypothesis and 
developing a model. The last part of this section reveals the empirical findings of our 
research. Finally, Section 4 summarizes and concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
The wide prior international literature focused on corporate governance codes 
often analyzed them with the purpose of finding an answer to the most controversial 
question “Will ever exist convergence in corporate governance systems?” (Yoshikawa 
and Rasheed, 2009). 
Finding an answer to this question needs first to distinguish between its main 
forms  that have been defined along time: “functional”, “formal” and “contractual” 
convergence (Gilson, 2000), “de jure” and “de facto” convergence (Khanna et al., 
2006), “hybrid convergence” (Rose, 2001), “normative convergence” (Milhaupt, 2001) 
and “institutional convergence” (Chamy, 1998). According to these studies, “de jure” 
convergence and the “formal” one have the same meaning, but at different levels (the 
country, respectively the firms’ one), both of them revealing an increasing closeness in 
terms of legal frameworks, by adopting similar corporate governance laws, but at 
different levels. 
Thus, our study might be considered as a research on “de jure” convergence of 
corporate governance codes in force in European Union member states towards a 
general accepted framework of good principles, issues by OECD. 
Regarding “formal” or “de jure” convergence, there is evidence showing that 
“there does seem to be convergence on certain common core principles based usually 
around the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance” (Mallin, 2004), mainly due to 
the common elements introduced in major European regulations, as well as to the 
similarities in forthcoming legislation of the European directives (Wymeersch, 2002). 
On the other hand, the majority of the codes of the European Union countries 
are not in full accordance with the priorities of the European Commission (Hermes et 
al., 2006). This is the conclusion reached after an analysis performed for identifying to 
what extent the contents of these codes are driven by external (internationally 
accepted corporate governance best practices) or domestic (national institutions) 
forces. 
These conclusions have been reached mainly from theoretical studies, prior 
literature focused on comparative analysis of corporate governance regulatory systems 
providing little empirical evidence in this respect. 
However, in the latest years, there were some attempts in conducting empirical 
research (Cicon et al., 2010), aiming to analyze European corporate governance codes      
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on their content, variability and convergence, from different perspectives, like their 
theme, their issuer and legal regime. Using a textual methodology based on Latent 
Semantic Analysis (LSA) (Deerwester, 1990) on a sample of 23 different European 
national codes, international researches examined the thematic content of their 
governance codes reaching to the conclusion that some elements of continental 
governance codes are converging to the U.K. model while others diverge, thus failing 
to find empirical evidence of “total” convergence towards Anglo-Saxon model of 
corporate governance. 
Other empirical analysis performed were aimed to compare international 
corporate governance provisions ability to protect various stakeholders, such as 
shareholders, especially the minority ones, creditors and even workers (Siems, 2009; 
Martynova and Renneboog, 2010).  
Using different research methodologies, some authors intended to address the 
convergence debate empirically, by measuring the convergence of corporate 
governance regimes across the countries using indices developed in this respect. 
Thus, these authors (Siems, 2009) developed indices that indicate how well 
countries considered for sampled analysis (France, Germany, UK, US and India) 
protect shareholders, creditors and workers, by using 144 legal variables coded for 
each country-year, covering a relatively long time period (1970 to 2005). By calculating 
the differences between each variable in the law of a particular legal system, using 
“leximetrics” methodology (Lele and Siems, 2007; Siems, 2001) the authors could 
conclude if there is a formal convergence, persistence, or divergence of rules, the 
general conclusion reached revealing that the laws have converged in shareholder 
protection, diverged in worker protection, and evened out in creditor protection. 
Following the same convergence approach, other researchers (Martynova and 
Renneboog, 2010)  developed indices that indicate how the law in each country 
addresses various potential agency conflicts, using a unique database that comprises 
the main changes in corporate governance regulations in the US and all European 
countries between 1990-2005. Hence, empirical analysis is focused this time on a wide 
range of countries but covers a shorter period of time. Instead, information used for the 
performed analysis are more comprehensive, being based on the study of various 
corporate governance regulations, on the results from a detailed questionnaire sent to 
more than 150 legal experts, and on direct interviews with some of these experts. 
In contrast to the “LLSV ranking system” (La Porta et al., 1997), the three new 
corporate governance indices that reflect the quality of national laws aimed at 
protecting corporate shareholders from being expropriated by management, minority 
shareholders from being expropriated by large block-holder, and creditors from being 
expropriated by shareholders, capture a broader scope of corporate governance 
regulation reforms and their dynamics. 
The conclusion reached reveal that countries of English legal origin still provide 
the highest quality of shareholder protection, while Continental European countries 
have improved their legal system up to the standard set by the English one, the 
dominant legal strategy across countries to address this protection being the    
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improvement of corporate transparency. 
 
3. Research desigh and results 
 
Because Anglo-American model seemed to prevail the other systems of 
corporate governance, as the most research findings reveal, and the improvement of 
corporate transparency proved to be the dominant legal strategy across countries 
followed in this respect, we decided to focus our attention on this topic through a 
different approach. 
Unlike most prior research that compared various corporate governance codes 
aiming to identify convergence towards the Anglo-American model, we selected for 
comparison an international framework (OECD principles of corporate governance), 
whose  recommendations have the character of good governance principles, thus 
ensuring added value to our study. 
Thus, the purpose of our empirical study is to analyze corporate governance 
codes in terms of disclosure and transparency compliance with OECD requirements 
and recommendations by reference to various features related to their issuers and 
other particular characteristics.  
In this respect, we will perform an quantitative analysis with character of 
comparison, referring as well to previous research findings on the same topic, followed 
by testing possible correlations for developing a linear model of regression. 
 
Hypothesis and model development 
 
Prior literature show that the corporate governance codes’ issuers varies across 
countries (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Enrione, et al., 2006; Zattoni, and 
Cuomo, 2008). There are also empirical evidences that reveal differences between 
codes by comparing the relative importance given to various issues, after classifying 
the codes into particular groups (Cicon et al., 2010). 
Basing on prior conclusions (Cicon et al., 2010) related to “disclosure” theme 
weight on each type of issuer defined, our paper is aimed to identify, using a different 
research method, the importance given to disclosure by each analyzed codes in 
comparison with prior findings, by considering the same groups of codes. 
 
Consistent with the association between our empirical results and previous 
related research findings, our first hypothesis can be stated as the following: 
 
H1: The compliance  of corporate governance codes with OECD 
principles is consistent with prior research findings related to 
“code’s issuer type”. 
 
In order to add value to our research, firstly, we extended the sample from 21 
European Union members states whose corporate governance codes were analyzed      
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(Cicon et al., 2010) to all 27 current members, thus providing a more comprehensive 
image of our research topic.  
Secondly, we reclassified our sample of codes into five groups, partially different 
than those previously defined by the same authors. Thus, we maintained the group 
“exchange” made of those codes issued by a national stock exchange, while 
“composite” and “industry” groups, were renamed as “corporate governance 
committees”, respectively “enterprises”, related to their content made of special boards 
or committees set up for corporate governance issues or associations dealing with 
private business. Besides that, two new groups (“securities” and “financial”) were 
added, referring to those issuer coming from those economic fields suggested by each 
group’s name.  
Moreover, we treated as a different variable the development of a code by a 
working group (“composite” group, according to prior literature), measuring it by the 
number of different areas where members’ group are coming from.  
Finally, we considered for our analysis two more categories of features related to 
corporate governance codes besides issuer’s type. One category refers to codes’ 
history, while the other one is focused on transparency and disclosure, all these being 
detailed in the sub-section dealing with variables definition.  
Making use of data collected in this respect and appealing to statistical tools, our 
paper is aimed to identify possible correlations between various codes’ characteristics 
and their interest in making “internal” information publicly available.  
 
Hence, our second hypothesis can be stated as the following: 
 
H2: There is a relationship between certain features of corporate 
governance codes and “transparency and disclosure” issues 
provided. 
 
Finally, by testing the above hypotheses, we estimated the following  linear 
regression model, using the ordinary least squares (OLS) technique, that reveals the 
influences of codes’ features over the disclosure index (D&T S_Index): 
 
D&T S_Index = f (vi) = const + αi * vi 
 
where  vi, are all significant dependent variables analyzed (respectively various 
features of corporate governance codes) that might have an influenced over the 
independent variable expressed by D&T S_Index (the index that measures the extent 
to which each code complied with general principles of good corporate governance as 
regards disclosure and transparency). 
 
 
    
 
 
                                  Studies in Business and Economics 
                   Studies in Business and Economics - 99 - 
 
Sample selection and variables definition 
 
  The sample used in our study consists of the European Union member states, 
all twenty-seven countries having currently adopted a corporate governance code, 
according to the website of the European Corporate Governance Institute -  an 
international scientific non-profit association promoting best practice in this field, which 
was the main source of information for our research.  
The empirical analysis performed uses a set of independent variables and one 
dependent variable for testing possible correlations between them. 
 
The independent variables comprise various features of corporate governance 
codes mainly related to their issuer, history and importance given to aspects about 
“transparency and disclosure”. The entire set of 12 independent variables used, their 
meaning and values assigned are detailed below: 
-  CIT (Code’s Issuer Type) – this variable takes values from 1 to 5 as it follows: 1 
value for those issuers who are members of various trade, industrial or 
enterprise associations (“enterprise”), 2 value in case of codes issued by 
financial institutions or authorities (“financial”), 3 value if a national stock 
exchange has settled the code (“exchange”), 4 value in case of codes issued by 
securities commissions or investment companies (“securities”), while 5 value is 
assigned to codes issued by special committees set up for corporate 
governance issues (“corporate governance committees”). 
-  CDD (Code’s Development Diversity) – it refers to those cases when a code was 
developed by working groups made of specialists from various fields, like: 
members of federations or associations from private  environment, academic 
professors, members of internal auditors’ institutes or accountants’ associations, 
officials of banking, finance, insurance or securities commission, investment 
brokers and other financial representatives; this variable is expressed in 
absolute values; 
-  AYFC (Adoption Year of the First Code) – it refers to the year of adoption the 
first code on corporate governance; this variable is expressed in absolute 
values; 
-  AN (Amendments Number) – it reflects the total number of amendments to a 
code from the first adoption up to present; this variable is expressed in absolute 
values; 
-  AYCC (Adoption Year of the Current Code) - it refers to the adoption year of the 
corporate governance code presently in force; this variable is expressed in 
absolute values; 
-  CNP (Code’s Number of Pages) – it shows the length of a code expressed by 
the total number of pages; this variable is expressed in absolute values; 
-  DC (Disclosure Chapter) – it is a binary variable, which takes 1 value if a code 
has a separate chapter dealing with transparency and disclosure issues and 0 
value otherwise;      
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-  DCNP (Disclosure Chapter’s Number of Pages)  -  it shows the length of the 
chapter dealing with transparency and disclosure, being expressed by its 
number of pages; this variable is expressed in absolute values; 
-  DK (Disclosure Keyword) – it counts for word “disclosure” in the whole text of the 
code; this variable is expressed in absolute values; 
-  TK (Transparency Keyword) - it counts for word “transparency” in the whole text 
of the code; this variable is expressed in absolute values; 
-  CGDTD (Corporate Governance Definition reference to 
Disclosure/Transparency)  –  it is a binary variable, which takes 1 value if the 
definition of corporate governance refers to “disclosure” or “transparency” and 0 
value otherwise; 
-  DTD (Disclosure / Transparency Definition) - it is a binary variable, which takes 1 
value if either “disclosure” or “transparency” are defined within the code and 0 
value otherwise. 
 
The dependent variable  used in our study (D&T S_Index) is the Jaccard’s 
similarity index established for each corporate governance code, revealing the degree 
of similitude between them and OECD principles as regards the compliance with 
disclosure and transparency requirements and recommendations (Ştefănescu, 2011). 
 
Empirical findings 
 
a) 1st hypothesis testing 
To ensure comparability between our empirical results and prior findings in order 
to test our first hypothesis, we reduced our sample just at the European Union member 
states previously analyzed (Cicon et al., 2010), considering their classification 
according to the issuer’s type.  
 
Table 1 comprises a detailed situation of codes distribution across issuer type 
and country, providing as well the values of  disclosure index (D&T S_Index). 
 
Table 1 Distribution of codes across issuer type and country 
Country 
D&T 
S_Index 
Codes’ Issuer 
Type (*) 
Austria  0.605  Composite 
Hungary  0.605  Industry 
Luxembourg  0.605  Exchange 
UK  0.579  Government 
Slovakia  0.579  Exchange 
Belgium  0.579  Composite 
Latvia  0.447  Exchange 
Slovenia  0.447  Exchange    
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Greece  0.447  Industry 
Finland  0.447  Industry 
Poland  0.421  Exchange 
Czech Republic  0.421  Government 
Spain  0.395  Government 
The Netherlands  0.395  Government 
Portugal  0.368  Government 
Sweden  0.289  Industry 
Romania  0.237  Industry 
Germany  0.211  Government 
Estonia  0.211  Exchange 
Italy  0.211  Exchange 
France  0.184  Industry 
(*) according to prior classification (Cicon et al., 2010) 
Source: own results and prior research findings (Cicon et al., 2010) 
 
Basing on the disclosure index (D&T S_Index) of each corporate governance 
code and considering the four groups of issuers, we determined an average disclosure 
index for each group, thus allowing performing the proposed comparison analysis.  
 
Table 2. provides data on  distribution of codes across issuer type and 
“disclosure” theme weight, respectively average disclosure index. 
 
Table 2. Distribution of codes across issuer type and  
“disclosure” theme weight / average index 
Issuer Type (*) 
Average D&T 
S_Index 
Accounting / 
Disclosure 
 Theme Weight 
Composite  0.592  41.78% 
Exchange  0.417  34.18% 
Government  0.394  29.03% 
Industry  0.368  9.76% 
(*) according to prior classification (Cicon et al., 2010) 
Source: own results and prior research findings (Cicon et al., 2010) 
 
Values of the average disclosure index are consistent with prior findings, which 
reveal that the “composite” group focused on “accounting and disclosure” weighted this 
dimension of corporate governance more highly than any other issuer, being followed 
by “exchange” and “government” issued codes that also placed high emphasis on this 
theme. However, our index show higher values for all types of issuers and, unlike prior 
findings, little difference between “government” and “industry” issued codes. 
Anyway, the importance given to “disclosure” by each type of issuer shows the      
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same order, thereby allowing us to accept our first hypothesis (H1). Thus, we can 
assert that the compliance of corporate governance codes with OECD principles as 
regards “disclosure and transparency” is consistent with prior research findings, 
considering the “code’s issuer type”. 
 
b) 2nd hypothesis testing 
Our research does not stop just a simple comparison with previous conclusions 
reached by other authors interested on the same topic, but goes further, wondering if 
there is a “link” between codes’ interest on promoting disclosure, as a good practice of 
corporate governance, and their issuer type. Consequently, it becomes natural asking 
ourselves  “Which type of issuer is the most interested in  setting up a corporate 
governance code encouraging transparency?”  or even more than that “Are codes 
developed by collaborations of various specialists “better” in this respect?”.  
Answering to our first question through the average disclosure index probably 
would not lead us to the most appropriate result. Thus, we decided to perform a 
different analysis, trying to identify possible correlations between issuers’ features 
(type and diversity) and codes’ ability to ensure a high level of  disclosure and 
transparency.  
This time, we considered for our analysis the whole sample of 27 member states 
of the European Union, thus ensuring a global comprehensive approach on this topic. 
The new variable introduced in our study, revealing the diversity of issuers involved in 
developing a code derives from the “composite group” defined by other researchers 
(Cicon et al., 2010), but it was given a different meaning by measuring the number of 
members implied in this process, coming from different fields.  
 
For performing the analysis, we made use of Pearson correlation coefficient that 
is used for measuring the strength of linear dependence between two variables, giving 
a value between “1”, that describes the perfect direct relationship and “-1”, that reveals 
an indirect one, “0” value meaning that there is no linear correlation between variables. 
 
Table 3. shows the values of Pearson correlations between disclosure index 
(D&T S_Index) and the two features of an issuer considered for analysis – its type and 
diversity: 
 
Table 3. Correlations between disclosure index and codes issuer features 
    D&T 
S_Index 
CIT  CDD 
D&T S_Index  Pearson Correlation  1  -.441
*  .410
* 
  Sig. (2-tailed)    .021  .034 
  N  27  27  27 
CIT  Pearson Correlation 
-.441
*  1 
-
.626
**    
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  Sig. (2-tailed)  .021    .000 
  N  27  27  27 
CDD  Pearson Correlation 
.410
* 
-
.626
** 
1 
  Sig. (2-tailed)  .034  .000   
  N  27  27  27 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Source: calculations made by authors using SPSS software 
 
By analyzing the values of Pearson’s coefficient, we reached to the conclusion 
that there is a medium indirect, respectively direct correlation between the dependent 
variable (D&T S_Index) and the independent variables CIT (Code’s Issuer Type) and 
CDD (Code’s Development Diversity), both of them being significant with a high 
probability of 95% (Sig. < 0,05).  
 
Thus, our wondering about a possible relationship between codes’ interest on 
promoting transparency and certain features of the issuer reaches to an affirmative 
consensus. Moreover, we also received an answer to our questions. Accordingly, 
those codes developed through the collaborations of a wider range of specialists, 
coming from various economic fields, and issued by special committees set for this 
purpose (classified as “corporate governance committee” group) appeared to be most 
closer to the ideal model of best practices on corporate governance by means of 
disclosure and transparency. On the opposite side, there are corporate governance 
codes developed by a single issuer, more exactly those classified on “enterprises” 
group, that are more likely to defend their own interests through as little information 
disclosure as possible, rather that ensuring a transparent image. 
The positive answers received to our questions made us going further, looking 
for other such factors of influence than features related to codes’ issuer. Consequently, 
we continued our empirical study searching for other correlations. In these respect, we 
tested the influences of codes’ history, intending to identify if a recent or a distant 
adoption of the first corporate governance code or of the current one, as well as the 
number of amendments to a code, might have an influenced over their content as 
regards transparency and disclosure provisions.  
 
In table 4. there are presented the values of Pearson coefficient, very close to 
zero for all three considered variables AYFC (Adoption Year of the First Code), AN 
(Amendments Number) and AYCC (Adoption Year of the Current Code), thus revealing 
that any factor is not relevant for justifying any correlations. Consequently, these 
variables will be excluded from the final part of our study dealing with model 
development. 
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Table 4. Correlations between disclosure index and codes history  
    AYFC  AM  AYCC 
D&T 
S_Index 
Pearson Correlation  .052 
.16
3 
.237 
  Sig. (2-tailed)  .797 
.41
6 
.234 
  N  27  27  27 
Source: calculations made by authors using SPSS software 
 
Finally, we have also tested the impact of various other features of a code like its 
length, the existence of a separate chapter dealing with disclosure and transparency 
and its length, the frequency of using these words and their definition, if it is provided. 
 
Table 5. show the values of each considered feature analyzed: CNP (Code’s 
Number of Pages), DC (Disclosure Chapter), DCNP (Disclosure Chapter Number of 
Pages), DK (Disclosure Keyword), TK (Transparency Keyword), CGDTD (Corporate 
Governance Definition reference to Disclosure/Transparency) and DTD 
(Disclosure/Transparency Definition). 
 
Table 5. Correlations between disclosure index and codes importance given to 
“transparency and disclosure” 
    CNP  DC  DCNP  DK 
D&T  
S_Index 
Pearson Correlation  .472
*  .444
*  .638
** 
.694
*
* 
  Sig. (2-tailed)  .013  .020  .000  .000 
  N  27  27  27  27 
    TK  DTD  CGDTD 
D&T  
S_Index 
Pearson Correlation  .524
**  .418
*  .153 
  Sig. (2-tailed)  .005  .030  .445 
  N  27  27  27 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Source: calculations made by authors using SPSS software 
 
Pearson’s coefficient values reveal that usually, those codes having a large 
separate chapter dealing with corporate governance and which frequently use the 
words “disclosure” and “transparency” are the one that are closest to the “ideal” model 
of best corporate governance practices. This conclusion is explained in more than a 
half of cases (between 52,4% and 69,4%), being significant with a high probability of    
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99% (Sig. < 0,01). Moreover, evidence show that a large code, defining these concepts 
are also good influences in the same respect, but are able to explain this in less than a 
half number of cases (between 41,8% and 47,2%), their significance being lower (with 
a probability of 95% (Sig. < 0,05)).  
 
However, overall, our empirical findings allow us to accept the second 
hypothesis (H2), too. Thus, we can assert that there is a relationship between certain 
features of corporate governance codes and “transparency and disclosure” issues 
provided. 
 
c) model development 
Basing  on correlations already identified between variables, we continued 
performing our analysis by measuring to which extent is the dependent variable 
explained by all independent ones that proved to be significant.  
 
Table 6. and 7. are aimed to reveal the relationship between the variables and 
its significance. 
 
Table 6. The relationship between dependent variable  
and independent variables 
Model  R  R Square 
Adjusted  
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1  .834
a  .696  .561  .106394 
Predictors: (Constant), CIT, CDD, CNP, DC, DCNP, 
DK, TK, DTD 
Source: calculations made by authors using SPSS software 
 
Table 7. The significance of the relationship between variables  
ANOVA
b 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean  
Square 
F  Sig. 
1  Regression  .466  8  .058  5.150  .002
a 
Residual  .204  18  .011     
Total  .670  26       
a. Predictors: (Constant), CIT, CDD, CNP, DC, DCNP, 
DK, TK, DTD 
b. Dependent Variable: D&T S_Index 
Source: calculations made by authors using SPSS software 
 
Accordingly, as regards the significance of the relationship between dependent 
variable and all independent variables that proved to be important, we can assert that 
these is explained just in 56,1% of cases, as R Square calculated shows. 
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Finally, using the ordinary least squares  technique (OLS), we developed the 
following linear regression model, revealing all influences of codes’ features over D&T 
S_Index, that measures the extent to which each code complied with general principles 
of good corporate governance as regards disclosure and transparency: 
 
  D&T S_Index = f (vi) = const + α1 * CNP + α2 * DC + α3 * DCNP + α4 * DK + 
          +  α5 * TK  + α6 * DTD + α7 * CIT + α8 * CDD 
 
where the coefficients of correlations are detailed in Table 8.: 
 
Table 8. Coefficients of correlation between variables 
Model 
Unstandardized  
Coefficients 
Standard. 
Coeff. 
t  Sig. 
B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta 
1  (Constant)  .286  .124    2.301  .034 
CNP  .003  .002  .383  1.487  .154 
DC  .027  .075  .085  .363  .721 
DCNP  .017  .014  .325  1.230  .234 
DK  .002  .002  .183  .687  .501 
TK  -.001  .005  -.054  -.257  .800 
DTD  .122  .049  .384  2.483  .023 
CIT 
-.032  .024  -.262 
-
1.330 
.200 
CDD 
-.037  .030  -.255 
-
1.241 
.231 
a. Dependent Variable: D&T 
S_Index 
     
Source: calculations made by authors using SPSS software 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The results of the analysis performed for testing the first hypothesis of our paper 
are consistent with prior literature findings, adding value to our research by making use 
of an index of disclosure and transparency developed through a different method 
(based on Jaccard coefficients) than those used before by authors focused on similar 
topic, such as Latent Semantic Analysis (Cicon et al., 2010) or the “leximetrics” 
methodology (Lele and Siems, 2007; Siems, 2008). Thus, the level of importance given 
to transparency and disclosure in corporate governance codes was highest for those 
codes that contain representatives from at least two other groups, followed 
immediately by codes whose issuer are represented by national stock exchanges or    
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national legislatures or governmental ministries. Corporate governance codes issued 
by industry or trade associations are in the last place, but much closer to previous 
group than prior research findings (Cicon et al., 2010). 
The second hypothesis of our study brought another piece of originality to our 
paper not only  through a different classification of codes’ issuer, inspired from the 
same prior related research, but mainly through the correlations identified by using 
statistical tools (Pearson coefficient). Thus, related to the new groups of issuers 
created, the “corporate governance committee group” made of specialists coming from 
various economic fields proved to be the one that issued codes approaching the most 
the ideal model of best practices on corporate governance by means of disclosure and 
transparency. Moreover, our evidence shows that, besides issuer’s type and diversity, 
there are other features of a code that might influence the level of importance given to 
transparency and disclosures. These features are related to the length of a code, the 
separate chapter dealing with disclosure and transparency and its length or the 
frequency of using these words and their definition. On the other hand, we discovered 
that it does not matter how sooner or latter was adopted neither the first corporate 
governance code nor the current one. The number of amendments made to a code 
from its first adoption proved to have no importance, too. 
In conclusion, the performed empirical analysis provided consistent evidence, 
therefore allowing us to accept both hypothesis made and to create a function of 
regressions revealing all correlations identified. Finally, we can assert that codes’ 
issuer, but not only them, might influence the degree of compliance to requirements 
and recommendations made for helping each country in developing and implementing 
a good corporate governance system ensuring a higher level of transparency and 
disclosure. 
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